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Corruption in the Indian Business Context 
Abstract: 
The phenomenal economic rise of India over the past five years implies huge business 
opportunities for companies operating in India or intending to do business in India. It has also 
created opportunities for "rent-seeking behaviour" on part of public officials (Bhagwati, 
1982; Bardhan, 1997; Rose-Ackermann, 1999) and "illegitimate gain seeking behaviour" on 
part of business managers ( ) as evidenced by the exposure of a number of high profile 
corruption scandals involving companies and public officials in recent years. 
The constant media exposure of one corruption scandal after another has drawn an 
unprecedented stakeholder response from India's civil society which appears determined to 
organising itself in the task of eliminating corruption from public life. This stakeholder 
situation calls for a responsible decision-making response to corruption in business on part of 
companies and business managers, to ensure that companies act ethically and retain 
stakeholder confidence in the longer term. The paper proposes a decision-making response 
that can be incorporated in every company's governance structure and put into practice to 
demonstrate one's commitment to honouring stakeholder obligations. 
Introduction: 
Corruption occurs daily in India as in other parts of the world. The universal occurrence of 
corruption in some form or the other is evident from the number of cases recorded and 
reported by Transparency International i in their daily email service sent to subscribers listing 
all reported incidents of corruption and bribery around the world. In addition, Transparency 
International conducts annual country-wise surveys of company executives, professionals and 
people in business to measure the extent of perceived corruption prevalent in that society. 
The results of these surveys are reported as a part of an international corruption index known 
as the Corruption Perception Indexii (CPI), listing the levels of perceived corruption in almost 
200 countries around the world. Corruption and its many hues such as bribery, thus, are not 
confined to any particular nation, geographical region or specific culture or religious belief 
but experienced in almost all countries either to a lesser or greater extent. Only the degree 
and context of corruption varies from nation to nation depending on the strength of 
governance mechanisms in operation. There is no nation on earth that can claim that they 
have never experienced any form of corruption. 
Corruption is not only a part of present day society but notable instances of corruption and 
bribery are found within historical records and religious texts of ancient civilizations of 
Egypt, India, China, Greece and the Roman Empire (Noonan, 1984; Alatas, 1990). In ancient 
India, Chanakya's treatise on financial governance, better known as Kautilya's Arthshastra 
has detailed 40 different ways in which public officials could make personal gains from their 
occupation of public office (see Rangarajan, 1992). The possibility of making personal gains 
from public office in India has not changed very much from the times of Chanakya as 
evidenced from the high profile corruption cases such as the 2 G telecom scandal in 2010. iii 
But what appears to have changed in recent times is the awareness and action being taken by 
civil society in India against corruption in public office. The formation of a NGO i.e. India 
Against Corruptioniv at a national level led by Anna Hazare v and the demand for a corruption 
free society in India is a new development in the stakeholder domain. Companies need to take 
into account such stakeholder expectations while formulating strategies and policies to deal 
responsibly with corruption that they may encounter in course of business. 
Against this backdrop, this paper aims to analyse corruption, its occurrence in India in the 
interface between public officials and business managers and the nature of networks of 
corruption in operation. The paper then proposes a decision-making framework to deal with 
corruption-related situations in order to strengthen their governance mechanisms, avoid 
ethical pitfalls and loss of stakeholder confidence. 
The first part of the paper explores drivers of corruption inherent in the role of public officials 
in general followed by the second section that places these drivers in the context of 
illegitimate gain seeking opportunities that businesses may seek from India's growing 
economic success. The third section then identifies certain actors that form the networks of 
corruption found in operation in the Indian context. The next section provides a decision-
making framework drawing on Freeman's principles of "stakeholder capitalism" as a 
responsible corporate response to corruption-related situations in business followed by the 
concluding section of the paper. 
Drivers of Corruption and public officials 
Scott (1972:14) has analysed corruption on part of public officials as a process emerging 
from the role of government as consumers, producers and spenders when compared to the 
"traditional order where state activity was limited more to functions of law and order, 
defense, and religious or ceremonial activities in the past." Public officials therefore have the 
opportunity to seek extraordinary quid pro quo benefits as consumers, producers and 
spenders as all these involve financial outlays and expenditure under their control and 
discretion. Klitgaard (1988:75) describes the conditions in which such corruption by public 
officials operates. He states that when agents (public officials) have monopoly power over 
clients by virtue of great discretionary powers that they (public officials) command by way of 
occupying a public office, they are likely to seek gains out of those powers. This likely 
situation of trade in discretionary powers of a public official is known as the demand side of 
corruption and has been termed as "rent-seeking behaviour" in literature (Bhagwati, 1982; 
Bardhan, 1997; Rose-Ackermann, 1999). 
In order to perpetuate and institutionalize rent-seeking behaviour, governance mechanisms, 
checks and balances in public institutions are weakened through a slow ineffective legislative 
and judicial process in order to reduce or eliminate any form of accountability to a nation. 
Klitgaard (1988:75) observes that ultimately the public official's accountability as an agent to 
the principal (the nation's electorate) becomes weak. In his work detailing control 
mechanisms for corruption he has defined these ingredients of a public official's corruption 
in an equation thus: Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion - Accountability. 
As is the case elsewhere, public officials in India hold enormous discretionary dispensing 
powers bearing financial importance ranging from purchases, contracting out services, 
issuing operation licenses, leases of industrial land and mines, permission to use of air space, 
sea lanes, air waves and more importantly the passage, interpretation and enforcement of 
laws. All these powers provide a plethora of temptations for public officials to seek avenues 
for personal enrichment in exchange for the dispensation of those powers vested in the office 
of a public official by a nation. Some authors believe that low salaries paid to public officials 
in the developing and the under developed world act as an incentive to behave in a corrupt 
manner, though this may not always be the case and has been open to debate (see Bardhan, 
1997). 
In addition, the public official can not only sell one's discretionary powers possessed by 
virtue of holding a public office but may be under compulsion as a part of an administrative 
structure to appease the demands of politicians in power who control the allotment of public 
offices. Thus, public officials operate within the concurrent political system of a nation and 
their actions are influenced by the informal group within the formal political/administrative 
structures that may require corrupt acts on their part as a quid pro quo for placing them in 
public office in the first place. For instance, a bureaucrat in civil service cannot afford to 
ignore the various factions in the state or central government who need to be appeased if one 
has to retain one's posting or position and therefore one's employment. The bureaucrat also 
has to survive political changes, retain a secure position and create his or her own power 
base, all of which have to be paid for. 
In any case the corrupt behaviour of public officials creates the demand side of corruption 
that frames the conditions for creation of quid pro quo relationships with gain-seeking 
business managers ( ). 
The Dispensation-seeker 
Complementing and nurturing the demand side of corruption is the dispensation seeker who 
is willing to buy the discretionary powers of a public official. This could be in the form of an 
active pursuit of corrupt means to secure them or a passive response to the demands made by 
public officials. At times, this behaviour is dictated by "fear of loss of business; personal 
career graph being pursued by company executives; fear of competitor actions and the 
pressures of financial markets to perform" ( ). In all cases, a sense of exchange is created 
either overtly or covertly through a process that this paper terms as a "corruption courtship 
process" where both parties are interested in establishing a relationship of quid pro quo and 
both go through the motions of working towards it in either explicit terms (blatant and open 
demand, offer and negotiation similar to a business transaction) or implicit terms where a 
primary sense of exchange underlies all communication. Johnston (1997:62) has explained 
the process that underlies this primary sense of exchange between public officials and others: 
The initiative may come from either private clients or public officials: 
the first may offer bribes, the second may delay decisions or contrive 
shortages until payments are made, or may simply exhort them. The 
climate of corruption can be so pervasive that no explicit demands 
are needed: "everybody knows" that decisions must be paidfor. 
This process of trade in discretionary powers and corruption courtship is nurtured by weak 
governance mechanisms that are not able to effectively oversee the administration of laws 
and political process in fair and equitable manner (as explained in Klitgaard, 1988). 
Between the public official and the dispensation-seeker, the process of corruption in public 
life is completed at a serious cost to a nation's public (Mauro, 1995; 1997). Although the 
process has two sides to it, namely the demand side and the supply side (Jacoby et aI, 1977; 
Klitgaard, 1988), it is usually difficult to pinpoint which one operates first as a catalyst to the 
process. It is the proverbial question of which came first, the chicken or the egg. Existing 
literature has not taken a clear stand on which one occurs first. However, in times of rapid 
development of any nation, the opportunities for corruption are manifold (see Theobald, 
1990) and such relationships of quid pro quo are likely to formed. 
India's Phenomenal rise and the opportunities for Corruption 
India is considered as one of the fastest growing economies and a global player of growing 
significance both economically and politically. The country ranked second for global foreign 
direct investment during 2010vi and received USD 17,081 million FDI during the months of 
April 2010 to January 2011.vii The cumulative flow of foreign direct investment into India 
between April 2000 and February 2011 amounted to USD 193.7 billion viii while Indian 
companies invested USD 80 billion outside India during that period mainly acquiring global 
brands and companies in different parts of the world. The Indian economy grew by 8.8 
percent and is slated to grow by 7.5 percent during 2011 despite the global financial problems 
in other parts of the world. 
With India's phenomenal growth comes the opportunity for corrupt public officials within the 
nation's political structure to seek extraordinary rents in exchange for their dispensing powers 
(see rent-seeking behaviour in Bhagwati, 1982; Bardhan, 1997; Rose-Ackermann, 1999) 
from businesses who seek opportunities (either legitimate or illegitimate) from India's 
economic boom. It is also a situation which encourages business interests to seek favours and 
benefits of a public official's dispensation powers for which they are willing to pay as a 
matter of commercial prudence or circumstances in order to continue doing business. 
Underlying Networks of Corruption in India 
India has witnessed mega corruption scandals involving billions of dollars along with the 
growth of India's economy in recent years. Each of these scandals that have come to public 
light revealed the presence of certain actors who formed a corrupt network to execute the 
illegitimate transactions. The Nira Radia tapes controversyix exposed the role of professional 
lobbyists in arranging relations of quid pro quo between public officials and businesses. A 
review of some of the prominent corruption scandals in India reveals the presence of 
connections between the political! administrative structure i.e. politicians and bureaucrats on 
one hand and businesses on another. In some of these cases, a subtle presence of organised 
crime is also noted. The presence of these actors i.e. public officials, businesses and 
organised crime form a nexus of corruption in India, similar to what has also been observed 
by Dellaporta & Vanucci (1999) in their work on corruption in Italy. 
The exposure ofNira Radia tapes have revealed the presence of a fourth actor in the network 
of corruption in the form of a section of the media that was appointed by Nira Radia to 
manage/ create favourable public opinion that would assist the other actors in the network of 
corruption. The role of all these actors and their inter relationships is depicted in figure 1 and 
explained. 
Figure 1: Networks of Corruption in the Indian Context 
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In figure 1, the demand side of corruption is represented by public officials who operate their 
position in public office as personal profit centres conducting rent~seeking activities. This is 
complemented by the supply side of corruption represented by businesses as gain~seeking 
actors in search of opportunities to make illegitimate gains from their access to corrupt public 
officials. The two way arrow in figure 1 confirms the mutually beneficial, interdependent 
relationship of exchange between the two in a context of direct contact and communication. 
In addition to the two main actors, there are three other actors in the network of corruption in 
India, who act as facilitators of corruption, namely: 
i) Organised Crime as a 'deal enforcer' between the two main actors i.e. public officials 
and businesses. One way arrow originating from each of the main actors pointing 
towards organised crime in the figure stands for the mercenary role of organised crime 
available for hire by either party to enforce a corrupt deal that may need enforcing 
through coercion. 
ii) Liaison agencies/ Lobbyists play the role of 'go betweens' when the two main actors 
do not wish to corne in direct contact or the main actors have not corne in direct 
contact previously but intend to establish direct contact. These agencies are paid 
legitimate fees for their services plus commissions and other fees which mayor may 
not be off the books of accounts of the client company. The Nira Radia case offers 
unusual insights into the role of some of these agencies in executing corrupt deals 
between the two main actors. The one way arrow originating from businesses towards 
liaison agencies followed by another one way arrow originating from liaison agencies 
to public officials depicts the initiative that is taken by businesses and liaison agencies 
to create relationships of corrupt deals with public officials under the instructions of 
illegitimate gain-seeking businesses. 
iii) The presence of media as a third facilitator has been noticed in the Nira Radia case 
where the lobbyist used the media to manage or promote favourable public opinion 
that would suit her client or her interests. This situation does not apply to all sections 
of the media and this part of the diagram still has grey areas that need to be worked 
on. 
Please note that this paper is in a work-in-progress stage and therefore incomplete. It 
needs a lot more work and revision. I am submitting this paper with the purpose of 
being able to present this paper and associated ideas at the conference with a view to 
seeking critical feedback from an Indian and international audience of respected 
academics. 
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based in Berline with chapters in 90 countries worldwide. More information available at 
http://www . transparency .org/ 
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iii, India's 2 G Telecom scandal spans the spectrum of abuse' available at 
http://knowledge.whmton.upenn.edu/indiaiartic1e.cfm?artic1eid=4549 accessed on July 30, 2011 
iv More information on India Against Corruption, India's civil society anti-corruption movement at 
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